The Creeping Breach of International Law by Mendoza, Antonio
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-1993
The Creeping Breach of International Law
Antonio Mendoza
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Antonio Mendoza, The Creeping Breach of International Law, 16 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 107 (1993).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol16/iss1/3
The Creeping Breach of International
Law
ANTONIO MENDOZA*
I. INTRODUCTION
International trade continues to gain importance in U.S. for-
eign relations. The political and military confrontations between
the Soviet Union ("U.S.S.R.") and the United States that domi-
nated the international scene following the end of World War II
have subsided. Now, however, economic confrontations between
the United States, the European Community, and Asia are becom-
ing more widespread, and the battles are in the arena of trade ne-
gotiations. As a result, more countries are entering into bilateral
and multilateral negotiations to reduce international trade barriers
in the sale of goods, transfer of technology, provision of services,
sale of securities, and a host of other business transactions. This
increase and the growing complexity of international trade provide
incentives for the United States to settle trade conflicts through the
use of treaties.'
At the same time, negative attitudes in the United States to-
ward international trade are on the rise. This may be due to dra-
matic increases of inward foreign direct investment,2 or to general
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Law, 1978. The author thanks Professor Jack Coe for his insightful comments on an earlier
draft and Julie Barker for her able research assistance.
1. For purposes of this Article, a treaty means "an international agreement con-
cluded between States in written form and governed by international law." Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, at 289 (1969),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 L.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Although the United States signed the Vienna Convention, the Senate did not ratify it.
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has treated this provision as authoritative for U.S.
law purposes. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982). In addition, the State Depart-
ment has recognized the Treaty as declarative of customary international law. REsTATE-
MENr (THiRD) OF THE FOREiGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES, introductory
note, pt. III, 144-45 (1986) [hereinafter REsTATEMmr].
2. "From 1980 to 1985, the FDIUS [Foreign Direct Investment in the United States]
position increased from $83 billion to $185 billion, or at an average annual rate of growth
of 17 percent. From 1985 to 1989, the FDIUS position grew slightly faster at an average
annual rate of growth of 21 percent to $401 billion." DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FoREIGN Di-
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subjective notions that the United States is losing prestige as a
world economic power, that foreigners are "buying up America,"
or that other nations are treating the United States unfairly. 3 In
addition, the emergence of Japan and the European Community as
world economic powers, the growth of Arab countries as world
money centers, and the United States' loss of status in the world
trading community are causing a profound shift in the way
America perceives itself and how others perceive it.
The negative attitude towards international trade is aggravat-
ing the systemic conflict between international law and the U.S.
domestic legal system.4 This Article will examine this conflict and
its impact on foreign nationals. First, it will analyze the reception
of treaties into the U.S. domestic legal system, focusing on treaty
provisions that guarantee non-discriminatory treatment embodied
in the national treatment standard. Next, the Article will analyze
federal statutory law that raises doubts about whether it treats for-
eign nationals equally. Finally, this Article will discuss the need for
reconciliation and congruent practice in the application of domes-
tic legal rules to valid treaty obligations.
RECF INVESTMIENT IN THE UNITED STATES: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DEVEL-
oPmENTs 22-23 (1991) (a report in response to a request by the U.S. Congress).
3. The subjective notion is reinforced by objective data which shows the United
States to be in an unfamiliar trade and financial position. The trade deficit in 1980 was
$73.8 billion. In 1990, it reached $220 billion, a record level. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT &
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, hist. tbl. 7.1 (1992). In the early
1980s, foreigners owed Americans some $2,500 per family, making the United States the
world's leading creditor nation. By 1988, however, the U.S. Government had borrowed
record sums, and the balance against the United States now amounts to more than $7,000
per family, making the United States the world's largest debtor nation. BENJAMIN M.
FRIEDMAN, A DAY OF RECKONING: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC POL-
ICY UNDER REAGAN AND AFTER 6 (1988). The federal deficit in 1980 was $908 billion and
grew to $3.2 trillion in 1990. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, supra, hist. tbl. 7.1.
4. The systemic conflict is created when a treaty provision is denied applicability in
the U.S. domestic legal system even though it is an international legal obligation of the
United States. The treaty as an international obligation is stated in the doctrine of pacta
sunt servanda, perhaps the most important principle of international law: "Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 26 (codified as amended at RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 321 (1986)).
Real or perceived unfair trade practices by Japan, Germany, and other developed and
developing countries have resulted in actual or proposed legislation that borders on xeno-
phobia, especially with respect to foreign direct investment. A national compulsion with
establishing a "level playing field," and the ever-present cry that "foreign companies are
not paying their fair share of taxes," result in legislation that has little regard and even
disdain for existing U.S. treaty obligations. This attitude is aggravating the systemic con-
flict between the U.S. domestic legal system and the international legal system.
Creeping Breach of International Law
The hypothetical case of Ernst, a German national, will be
used to track the national treatment standard and the treatment he
actually receives under U.S. domestic law. Ernst will be involved
in two separate transactions: (1) the unfriendly takeover of a U.S.
company engaged in the manufacture and sale of computer chips;
and (2) the purchase of 10,000 acres of farmland in Texas. The
computer chip company makes an appealing target because ineffi-
cient management has created shareholder displeasure.
Ernst resides in Germany and harbors no desire to live in the
United States. The perceived openness of the U.S. markets and
the national treatment guarantees found in the United States-Ger-
many Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") Treaty and
tax treaties encourage him to make his investments. Ernst will
soon discover, however, that the U.S. legal system does not always
provide the protection that the drafters of the treaties expected
their provisions to offer.
II. THE RECEPTION OF TREATIES INTO THE U.S. DOMESTIC
LEGAL SYSTEM: THm SYSTEMIC CONFLICT WTH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The treaty-making process begins when the executive branch
negotiates the treaty and the U.S. Senate ratifies it.5 Upon ratifica-
tion, the treaty becomes an international obligation among the
states involved.6 This fact may not be of much importance to
Ernst, however, as his legal protection is derived from how the U.S.
domestic legal system receives and applies the treaty.
The legal theory of a particular state dictates how a treaty pro-
vision will be received and treated at the domestic level (and the
resulting potential conflict). In a traditional monist state,7 interna-
5. The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2.
6. It should be noted, however, that error, fraud, and corruption of a representative
of a state, as well as coercion and conflict with a peremptory norm of general international
law (Jus Cogens), provide a basis for invalidating an otherwise valid treaty. Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 1, § 2, arts. 46-53; RESTATmMENT, supra note 1, § 331.
7. International law theorists divide states into two principal categories: Monist and
Dualist. The Monists view international law as unitary, with the international and domes-
tic legal systems being integral parts of the same system. The traditional monist view is
that, in a conflict between international law and national law, international law always
prevails. The Dualists, on the other hand, see international law and domestic law as in-
dependent of each other. To Dualists, international law regulates the relations of the sov-
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tional and domestic law do not conflict because the state considers
international law to be directly applicable and supreme.8 Similarly,
no conflict exists in a dualist state9 because it treats international
legal systems as independent and never directly applicable
domestically.
In either a monist or a dualist state, the status of a treaty is
clear. Conflicts and confusion occur in states, like the United
States, that use a system of self-executing and/or non self-executing
treaties. This system mixes the non-traditional monist and dualist
schools of thought. The separation of powers between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the Federal Government,10 the fed-
eralist system,1 and the relatively static nature of treaties12
increase the conflict.
ereign, whereas domestic law regulates the internal affairs of the state. Under this theory,
international law can only be applied in a state where it has been expressly incorporated
into the national legal system. See REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INrTRNATIONAL LAW 31-51
(1986).
8. In some monist states, treaty provisions, even though directly applicable, may not
be supreme because of their hierarchical status in the domestic system. If the treaty provi-
sion is given higher status than the domestic system (traditional monist view), subsequent
domestic legislation will not overrule it. If, however, the treaty provision is not given
higher status than the domestic system, subsequent domestic legislation will overrule it.
John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 Am. J.
IN'L L. 310, 320 (1992).
9. See discussion supra note 7.
10. The separation of powers between the branches is traced directly to the Constitu-
tion. "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate commerce with foreign Nations .... "
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
11. Individual states have been active in passing legislation that affects valid treaty
provisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that a treaty provision "cannot be
rendered nugatory in any part of the United States by municipal ordinances or state laws.
It stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution and
laws of the United States." Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). Notwithstanding
this rule, individual states have attempted to regulate foreign investment. For a discussion
of the constitutionality of state attempts under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Foreign Affairs Power, see generally Cheryl Tate, Note, The Constitutionality of State At-
tempts To Regulate Foreign Investment, 99 YALE LJ. 2023, 2033-42 (1990).
12. Treaties are static instruments, formulated with reference to circumstances ex-
isting at the time of the particular treaty's conclusion. They rarely provide a predictable
mechanism for accommodating change, thus becoming vulnerable to the political pragma-
tism of federal lawmakers. Note, however, that the doctrine of rebus sic standibus does
allow some relief:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by
the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from
the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential
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III. THE SELF-EXECUTING/NON SELF-EXECUTING DICHOTOMY 13
A self-executing treaty generally follows the non-traditional
monist view. It is thus directly applicable in the U.S. domestic sys-
tem, and, upon becoming an obligation under international law, it
forms a part of U.S. domestic law on an equal status with federal
statutory law.14 A non self-executing treaty, on the other hand, fol-
lows the dualist view. It requires the adoption of implementing
legislation to become part of the U.S. domestic system. In fact, the
implementing legislation itself, and not the treaty, is the law that
gives rise to obligations under international law.15
The systemic conflict between international law and U.S. fed-
eral law can occur in several ways. First, when a self-executing
treaty provision is directly applicable in the U.S. legal system but is
inferior to federal statutory law, and Congress subsequently passes
a clearly inconsistent statute, the treaty provision has no effect in
the U.S. domestic system.16 This is true even though the treaty
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of
the change is to radically transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 62(1).
13. For a discussion asserting that the distinction between self-executing and non self-
executing treaties is a judicially-invented doctrine inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution,
see generally Jordan J. Poust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988).
14. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
15. The threshold question of whether a treaty is self-executing or non self-executing
has caused conflict. The courts have held that a treaty is non self-executing when the
treaty relates to a power exclusive to Congress, e.g., the appropriation of money or the
raising of revenue.
Thus, the expenditure of funds by the United States cannot be accomplished by
[a] self-executing treaty; implementing legislation appropriating such funds is in-
dispensable. Similarly, the constitutional mandate that 'all Bills for raising Reve-
nue shall originate in the House of Representatives' .. . appears, by reason of the
restrictive language used, to prohibit the use of the treaty power to impose taxes.
Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The issue, however, is often filled
with uncertainty and with political considerations. See generally Griffin B. Bell & H. Miles
Foy, The Presiden4 the Congress, and the Panama Canal: An Essay on the Powers of the
Executive and Legislative Branches in the Field of Foreign Affairs, 16 GA. J. ITrr'L & COMP.
L. 607 (1986).
Other guidelines used in determining whether a treaty is self-executing or not are: (1)
whether the instrument itself states that implementing legislation is required; (2) whether
the Senate, in ratifying the treaty, requires implementing legislation; (3) whether Congress,
by resolution, requires implementing legislation; or (4) whether the Constitution requires
implementing legislation. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 111.4 n.5.
16. REsTATE Mr , supra note 1, §§ 115.1-.2. Because courts are obliged to give effect
to a subsequent federal statute, interpretive rules to prevent an unintentional breach of
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continues to be a valid international obligation. Second, when a
non self-executing treaty is negotiated by the executive branch and
ratified by the Senate, it becomes an international obligation. If
the implementing legislation ratified to receive the treaty into the
U.S. domestic system varies from the terms of the treaty, however,
the enabling legislation, and not the underlying treaty, becomes the
law in the United States. 17 Thus, the treaty provision has no effect
in the United States even though it continues to be a valid interna-
tional obligation. Finally, when a treaty, whether self-executing or
not, provides that a foreign national will be given the same treat-
ment as U.S. nationals, and subsequent federal legislation is passed
that discriminates against the foreign national, the U.S. legal sys-
tem denies relief against discrimination even though the interna-
tional obligation remains in force. This Article focuses on the third
scenario.
IV. THE NATIONAL TREATMENT STANDARD: THE PROMISE OF
NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT
As Ernst prepares to make a substantial investment in the
United States, he finds solace in the national treatment guaran-
tees18 found in the FCN Treaty: "Nationals and companies of
valid treaty provisions have been formulated. "[A]n act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (codified as amended at
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 114). This interpretive rule does not help in those cases
where a federal statute specifically overrides a treaty provision.
17. The implementing legislation transforms the international obligation into a do-
mestic law. The "act of transformation" itself can become a power struggle between the
executive and legislative branches of the government. Jackson, supra note 8, at 325.
18. The national treatment standard is a pledge by a contracting state that the one
state will not discriminate against the citizens of the other, that it will treat a national of the
other treaty country the same as its own nationals. The aim of the standard is to provide
non-discriminatory treatment. Herman Walker, Jr., Modem Treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, 42 MtN1. L. REv. 805, 810-11 (1957-58). In a tax context, national
treatment is described in the principle of horizontal equity: "Persons who are similarly
situated should be treated equally." BoRis I. BrrrKER & LAWREN CE LoKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrS § 3.1.4 (2d ed. 1989).
The United States has accepted the national treatment standard as good policy. For
example, then President Ronald Reagan stated:
With respect to foreign direct investment, U.S. policy has been to follow the na-
tional treatment standard, except in those instances involving national security.
The United States opposes the use of government practices which distort, restrict
or place unreasonable burdens on direct investment. .... The United States will
continue to work for the reduction or elimination of unreasonable and discrimi-
natory barriers to the entry of investment. The United States believes that for-
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either party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other
party, national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of
commercial, industrial, financial and other activity for gain.... ."19
The FCN Treaty also provides:
Nationals of either Party residing within the territories of the
other Party, and nationals and companies of either Party en-
gaged in trade or other gainful pursuit ... shall not be subject to
the payment of taxes, fees or charges imposed upon or applied
to income, capital, transactions, activities or any other object...
more burdensome than those borne in like situations by nation-
als and companies of such other Party.20
Additionally, the guarantee in the Income Tax Treaty states:
Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the
other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement con-
nected therewith that is other or more burdensome than the tax-
ation and connected requirements to which nationals of that
other State in the same circumstances are or may be subjected.21
For Ernst to avail himself of the national treatment guarantee,
however, he has to show like circumstances with U.S. nationals. 2
Specifically, he must show that the particular FCN or tax treaty
eign investors should be able to make the same kinds of investment, under the
same conditions, as nationals of the host country.
International Investment Policy Statement, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214, 1216-17
(Sept. 9, 1983).
19. Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., art.
VII(1), 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1850-51 [hereinafter FCN Teaty].
20. Id. art. XI, § 1.
21. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes, Aug. 24, 1989, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 24(1), available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX-IBFDTR library (Jan. 1, 1990) [hereinafter U.S.-F.R.G. Tax Treaty].
The national treatment standard, in substantially the same language, is also found in
the Model U.S. Income Tax Ieaty:
Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting
State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is other or
more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nation-
als of that other State in the same circumstances are or may be subjected.
Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 24, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 1022, at 1423 (1981).
22. The common language is that taxpayers must be "in the same circumstances,"
nationals must be "in like situations," and investors must be in "like situations." U.S. trea-
ties containing the national treatment pledge cover a broad range of international trade
issues such as sale of goods, taxation, investments, and general notions of friendship, com-
merce, and navigation. In the treaties, "likeness" or "sameness" are the prevalent formula-
tions of the principle. See sources cited supra note 21.
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does not provide for a derogation from its provisions,23 or that the
nature of the transaction does not warrant a denial of national
treatment.24 Ernst is confident that none of these limiting factors
exists and goes forward with the transactions. He is unaware that
Congress, in enacting the federal statutory framework, intended to
take advantage of foreign companies to raise capital.25
V. SPECIFIC FEDERAL STATUTES THAT RAISE DOUBTS OF
NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT
The statutes that arguably contravene the national treatment
standard cover the entire breadth of international trade. In their
wake, substantial questions arise regarding U.S. compliance with
the fundamental precepts embodied in the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda. The hypothetical case of Ernst will be used in this Sec-
tion to demonstrate the effect of these statutes on foreign persons.
23. The national treatment standard in FCN treaties can be subject to express excep-
tions involving certain types of vital activities; it may also be qualified by protocols that
sometimes accompany the treaties. See generally Note, The Rising Tue of Reverse Flow:
Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments?, 72 MicH. L REv. 551,
567-92 (1973-74) (analyzing 11 national treatment standards in FCN treaties and their ex-
ceptions). The national treatment guarantee in the German FCN Treaty is not limited by
the Protocol. See FCN Treaty, supra note 19, protocol, paras. 8-13.
The provisions in tax treaties allowing for derogation from treaty terms are those that
impose a limitation on benefits under the treaties. E.g., U.S.-F.R.G. Tax Teaty, supra note
21, art. 28. The objective of these provisions is to prevent non-contracting state nationals
(Third Country nationals) from enjoying the tax benefits under the treaties. Except in
those instances where "treaty shopping" is prohibited, tax treaties do not contemplate der-
ogation. The treaties do provide for notification to the other contracting state of any sig-
nificant changes that have been made in the respective state's tax laws. See, e.g., id art.
2(2). There is, however, no provision in the treaties that allows a specific derogation from
the treaties by subsequent federal legislation. The relevant provisions in the Model In-
come Tax Treaty use substantially the same language. See Model Income Tax Treaty, supra
note 21, arts. 2(2), 16.
24. Tax law does differentiate between foreign and domestic persons. Valid reasons
exist for some of these differences, especially in the area of Internal Revenue Service sum-
mons powers in tax examinations. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 982 (1988). In addition, tax with-
holding rules, which aid in the collection of the tax, differ between foreign and domestic
persons. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1445 (1988). These differences are understandable for
policy reasons because of the collection problems that could arise in dealing with foreign
jurisdictions.
25. "Levying higher taxes on foreign companies is seen as a painless-indeed popular
way of augmenting budget revenues." Foreigners as Scapegoats, FIN. TiMES, July 24, 1990,
at 18.
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A. The Unfriendly Takeover of the Computer Chip Company
1. The Initial Investment: Restrictions on Foreign Investment
Ernst faces an array of statutes that either restrict outright in-
ward foreign direct investment, based on the protection of vital na-
tional interests, or at least require him to report the investment.26
The statutory restrictions are found mostly in federal law and are
aimed at certain industries.27 These statutes are generally accepted
as a proper exercise of the power of a sovereign nation in the pro-
tection of its vital national interests. Some question, however, the
fairness to foreign persons of the newest addition to the federal
statutory framework in this area.
The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 19882 ("Exon-Florio") authorizes the
President (or designee) 29 to suspend or halt a merger, acquisition,
or takeover of a U.S. firm by a foreigner if it would threaten U.S.
national security interests? 0 Because "national security" is not de-
26. The International Investment and Trade in Services Act of 1976 gave the Presi-
dent "clear and unambiguous authority... to collect information on international invest-
ment and to provide analysis of such information to the Congress, the executive agencies,
and the general public." International Investment Survey Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472,
90 Stat. 2059 (1976) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (1988)). In addition, the
Internal Revenue Code requires that if "at any time during a taxable year, a corporation
... is a domestic corporation, and is 25-percent foreign-owned, such corporation shall
furnish... the information described in subsection (b)." I.R.C. § 6038A(a) (1986). Sub-
section (b), as amended, requires "[t]he name, principal place of business, and country or
countries in which organized or resident, of each person which (A) is a related party to the
reporting corporation, and (B) had any transaction with the reporting corporation during
its taxable year." I.R.C. § 6038A(b) (1986).
27. See, e.g., The Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 801-842 (1988)); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988));
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 95-163, § 14, 91 Stat. 1278, 1283 (1977) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(B) (1988)); Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91
(1872) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1988)); Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85,
41 Stat. 437 (1920) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988)); The Communica-
tions Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1086 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(a), (b)(1)-(2) (1988)).
28. The Omnibus Tade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) [hereinafter Omnibus Act].
29. The President has designated the Committee on Foreign Investment ("CFIUS")
to carry out the obligations under the Omnibus Act. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990
(1971-75), reprinted as amended in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(b) (1988).
30. The Amendment states:
[T~he President may take such action for such time as the President considers
appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a per-
son engaged in interstate commerce in the United States proposed or pending on
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
fined in the statute or the regulations31 and only foreign persons
are affected, Exon-Florio has the potential of being applied in a
discriminatory manner. This would violate the national treatment
standard provided by treaty,32 as there is no comparable federal
legislation that similarly affects U.S. nationals.
In the hypothetical case, Ernst commences the hostile take-
over. The management group, fearing the loss of jobs, resists the
takeover, alleging national security implications. A broad reading
of "national security" could stop the takeover. Thus, Exon-Florio
acts as an investment screening mechanism which inefficient man-
agement can use to stay in power, even where there is no real
threat to national security. The management group could not use
Exon-Florio if the same takeover was being attempted by a U.S.
national. Hence, Ernst is being treated differently on the basis of
his nationality.
Even if Ernst is able to overcome Exon-Florio, other restric-
tions await him.
2. Choice of Entity
Legal, control, and tax considerations dictate what form of
business organization an entity may choose. The litigious nature of
the U.S. society favors the use of an entity that limits the liability of
its shareholders. Ernst decides to operate as a domestic
corporation.
All income will be subject to U.S. taxes even if earned
abroad. 33 Yet, if Ernst is expecting losses in the early years, he
or after the date of enactment of this section by or with foreign persons so that
such control will not threaten to impair the national security.
Omnibus Act, supra note 28, § 5021, at 1425-26.
31. Instead of defining national security, the statute directs the President or his desig-
nee to consider certain national defense factors. Id.
32. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States Investment
Obligations in Conflict The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 120-29 (1989-90).
See also Cecilia M. Woldeck, Proposals for Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under the
Exon-Florio Amendment, 42 HASTnNGs LJ. 1175, 1177 (1991) (arguing that decisions
under Exon-Florio will be essentially political).
33. The United States taxes the worldwide income of its citizens. See Cook v. Tait,
265 U.S. 47 (1924). The United States also taxes its resident aliens. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701
(1988); 26 C.F.R. 1.871-1(a) (1980). The United States generally adopts a territorial ap-
proach with non-resident aliens and foreign corporations, taxing only their U.S. source
income. 26 U.S.C. §§ 872(a)(1), 882(a)(1) (1988). In some instances, however, even non-
U.S. income of a non-resident alien or a foreign corporation may be taxed if the income is
effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. 26 U.S.C. §§ 872(a)(2), 882(a)(2),
864(c)(4)-(5) (1988).
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cannot deduct those losses personally because U.S. law does not
make subchapter S election 34 available to the corporation. 35 In
contrast, a U.S. shareholder would be able to deduct these losses
personally. Therefore, U.S. law does not provide the horizontal
equity promised Ernst under the treaties.
B. Operating the Business and Extracting Profits
1. The Transfer Pricing Issue: The Scourge of Section 482
a. The Politics of Inter-Company Pricing
Now that Ernst has decided to operate as a domestic corpora-
tion, he must conduct the business. Politicians often complain that
foreign-owned corporations are not paying their "fair share" of
taxes on U.S. operations, 36 focusing on alleged price manipulations.
They claim that foreign corporations come into the United States,
make obscene profits, and remove those profits without paying
taxes.37 This is a curious complaint, as it is very similar to com-
plaints leveled by developing countries against U.S.-based multi-
national corporations.38 Nonetheless, there is keen interest in re-
viewing the operations of foreign-owned corporations in the
34. Under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, certain closely-
held corporations can elect to be treated as a pass-through entity. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379
(1984). Once a valid election has been made, items of income, loss, deductions, and credits
will be passed through the corporation to the shareholders.
35. 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1)(c) (1988).
36. "Many Members of Congress and American taxpayers feel that certain foreign
persons doing business in the United States or holding investments in the United States do
not pay their fair share of U.S. taxes." 138 CONG. REc. 3817-18 (1992) (statement of Rep.
Rostenkowski).
37. There are studies which do not attribute the low profits of foreign-owned compa-
nies to aggressive transfer pricing policy, but rather to start-up expenses, acquisition in-
debtedness, or other factors completely unrelated to any scheme of price manipulation.
See International Taxes, Gideon Urges 'Balanced' Approach on Foreign-Controlled Corpo-
ration Taxes, DAILY REP. ExEc. No. 135, July 13, 1990, at G-6.
38. The dispute centers on the proper value of the expropriated property. Develop-
ing states argue that the value of the plant owned by citizens of developed states, such as
the United States, should be adjusted to reflect the fact that the company has not contrib-
uted fairly to the country where it was doing business. They allege that profits and natural
resources are removed from the country and that nothing is left behind. The argument was
tacitly accepted by the United Nations when it adopted the "appropriate" standard of com-
pensation. The "appropriate" standard suggests that adjustments should be allowed for
unfair treatment to the developing state. See generally RICHARD LILLIH, THE VALUA-
TION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARD A CONSENSUS OR
MORE RiCH CHAOS, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 893 (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) (1975).
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United States. Ernst will likely become painfully aware of this
interest.
b. The Mechanics of Inter-Company Pricing
Companies are able to manipulate prices between controlled
corporations on inter-corporate sales. In particular, foreign corpo-
rations are able to manipulate prices by charging an inflated price
to the U.S. domestic corporation, typically a subsidiary, for goods
and services provided by the parent corporation. The inflated price
causes the net income of the U.S. domestic corporation to de-
crease, which, in turn, decreases the U.S. tax bill.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 partially addressed this prob-
lem.39 The biggest weapon in the U.S. arsenal against manipulative
transfer pricing, however, is Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code ("IRC"). It reads in pertinent part:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the
United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary
may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, ap-
portionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent eva-
sion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of such
organizations, trades, or businesses.4°
The Section is phrased broadly. Moreover, the actual wording
of the Section does not limit its application to areas involving inter-
national trade. Nevertheless, international Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS") agents have used it extensively in conducting
investigations.
Adjustments made under Section 482 are fact-intensive and
burdensome to refute. As a result, Section 482 adjustments involve
39. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides that, in inter-corporate transactions involv-
ing inventory sale and purchase between related persons, the amount of any costs that (1)
are taken into account in computing the basis or inventory cost of such property by the
purchaser and (2) are taken into account in computing the customs value of such property,
shall not, for purposes of computing such basis or inventory costs, be greater than the
amount of such costs taken into account in computing such customs value. 26 U.S.C.
§ 1059A(a) (1988).
40. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1954). To explain this deceptively brief Code Section, the IRS
has issued about 200 pages of legislatively-mandated regulations to explain it. Temp. Treas.
Regs. 1.482-OT, 1.482-1T, 1.482-2T-7T.
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substantial costs. Economists, accountants, engineers, and lawyers
must be hired to defend against Section 482 actions. Thus, Section
482 is an example of a statute that, although arguably usable
against all taxpayers, is applied more frequently against foreign
persons. 41 Therefore, Ernst can never truly be secure in thinking
that the IRS will respect the inter-company pricing arrangement
that he sets up.
2. The Branch Profits Tax
If Ernst selects a German corporation to avoid the problems
posed by Exon-Florio, the branch profits tax ("BPT") will ad-
versely affect his business operations. The BPT imposes a tax on
the dividend equivalent amount of a foreign corporation's U.S.
branch, in addition to the tax on its normal business operations. 42
Distributions from a U.S. branch to a domestic corporation home
office are not taxed.
Congress passed the BPT because it believed that prior law
discriminated in favor of foreign persons. The discrimination (in
tax parlance, the lack of horizontal equity) operates in this way: A
41. The use of Section 482 of the IRC as a direct weapon against foreign companies
surfaced in a proposed law that was not enacted. See 138 CONG. REc. 3819 (1992). The
Act would have made discriminatory treatment a part of the statute by imposing a mini-
mum tax on foreign corporations doing business in the United States whether or not any
actual income was generated, if their U.S. industry group as a whole generated income. In
a prepared statement about the proposed bill, the Treasury Department under then Presi-
dent Bush declared that the bill would breach notions of horizontal equity and the national
treatment standard provided by the Treaty. The Teasury Department was opposed to the
new Act because it would have discriminated against foreign-owned businesses in violation
of tax treaties and long-standing tax policy. The Treasury went on to say that non-discrimi-
nation articles in U.S. treaties require foreign-controlled taxpayers to be treated in the
same manner as similarly situated U.S.-controlled taxpayers. Further, the Teasury de-
clared that the bill would violate arms-length standards in treaties used by treaty partners
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Prepared Statement of
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Fred Goldberg Before House Ways and Means Committee
at hearing on H.R. 5270, The Foreign Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act of 1992,
July 21, 1992, DAILY REP. EXEC. No. 141, July 22, 1992, at D-67.
42. See FCN Yeaty, supra note 19, arts. 6-7.
The U.S.-F.R.G. Tax Teaty imposes a tax of 5% on the U.S. dividend equivalent
amount of the foreign corporation's U.S. branch. U.S.-F.R.G. Tax Treaty, supra note 21,
art. 10(9). The treaty reduces the 30% rate provided by the IRC, as amended. I.R.C.
§ 884(a) (1986).
The dividend equivalent amount is essentially the effectively connected earnings and
profits of the foreign branch for the taxable year, reduced by any increase in U.S. net
equity and increased by any decrease in U.S. net equity. U.S. net equity means U.S. assets
reduced by U.S. liabilities. 26 U.S.C. § 884(b)-(c)(1) (1988).
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branch of a U.S. domestic corporation transfers cash to its home
office; the home office (domestic corporation) then distributes the
cash to its shareholders. The cash distribution is then a dividend
subject to U.S. taxation.43 The converse situation is as follows: A
U.S. branch of a foreign corporation transfers cash to its home of-
fice; the home office (foreign corporation) then distributes the cash
to its foreign shareholders. The cash distribution to the foreign
shareholder is not subject to U.S. tax.44 Hence, under prior law,
U.S. taxpayers were taxed twice on the same income while foreign
taxpayers were taxed only once. To remedy this situation, the BPT
imposes a double tax on the foreign shareholder. Although this
seems fair at first, Ernst resides in Germany and has no desire to
live in the United States. Are Ernst and a domestic shareholder
situated so similarly as to warrant horizontal equity? Unfortu-
nately for Ernst, they are not.
45
Even if similar circumstances exist, which would support the
idea that foreigners should be taxed twice, the BPT overshoots the
mark. The BPT does not provide horizontal equity. In fact, it
treats foreign persons differently in two ways.
One difference is found in the timing of the tax. BPTs are
computed annually, when the tax return is filed.46 The tax is there-
fore forced each year. In the case of a domestic person, however,
the decision to pay dividends triggers the tax computation. Be-
cause the timing of dividend payments is within the discretion of
the board of directors of the corporation, the dividend is generally
controlled by the corporation. The timing of the payment is there-
fore more favorable to the U.S. citizen.
Even more significant is the dividend exclusion available to
certain domestic corporate shareholders, which can be as high as
one-hundred percent.4 7 The exclusion is allowed when the recipi-
43. 26 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 862(a)(2) (1988).
45. There are several differences. For example, a U.S. person can avail himself of all
the benefits of living in the United States, while Ernst cannot; a U.S. person can deduct
expenses against dividend income, yet Ernst cannot. See U.S.-F.R.G. Tax Treaty, supra
note 21, art. 10; I.R.C. § 212 (1986). For further reference, see generally Richard L.
Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-Owned Real Estate, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1091, 1121-23 (1983) (discussing, in the setting of the Foreign Investments in Real
Property Tax Act, that foreign persons are not in like circumstances with U.S. persons).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 884(a) (1988).
47. 26 U.S.C. § 243(a) (1988).
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ent of a qualifying dividend4 is an includible corporate member 9
of an affiliated group.50 The effect is that tax-free distributions are
available at the corporate level to certain domestic corporate per-
sons. By contrast, the dividend exclusion is not available to a com-
parable corporate arrangement involving a foreign corporation
because a foreign corporation cannot be a member of an affiliated
group.51
Disheartened by these problems, Ernst now considers the ac-
quisition of a Texas farmland.
C. The Investment in Texas Farmland
1. The Initial Investment
Congress is particularly wary about direct foreign investment
in real estate, especially agricultural land.5 2 When Ernst purchases
the agricultural land, he must comply with the reporting require-
ments imposed by the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure
Act ("AFIDA"). 53 AFIDA, enacted on October 14, 1978, is a fed-
eral reporting statute designed to safeguard agricultural land5 ac-
quired by foreigners. 55
AFMDA requires a foreign person who acquires or disposes of
an interest in agricultural land to report the transaction to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture within ninety days of the transaction's
48. The term qualifying dividends "means dividends received by a corporation, which
at the close of the day the dividends are received, is a member of the same affiliated group
of corporations... distributing the dividend." 26 U.S.C. § 243(b) (1988).
49. "As used in this chapter, the term 'includible corporation' means any corporation
except... foreign corporations." 26 U.S.C. § 1504(b) (1988).
50. An "affiliated group" means, among other things, one or more chains of includible
corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent corporation which
is an includible corporation. 26 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(1) (1988). A foreign corporation can
never be a part of an affiliated group since it cannot be an includible corporation under the
Statute. See definition of "includible corporation," supra note 49.
51. See discussion supra note 50.
52. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2914, 2915.
53. Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92
Stat. 1263 (1978).
54. "Agricultural land" is defined as land in the United States used currently or within
the last five years for farming, ranching, forestry, or timber production if the revenue ex-
ceeded $1,000 per year. 7 U.S.C. § 3508(1) (1988).
55. A "foreign person" is defined as: any foreign corporation; any person who is not a
citizen or resident alien of the United States; or a domestic corporation with a foreign
owner of a 10% interest. A "foreign corporation" is a corporation not organized under the
laws of any state in the United States. 7 U.S.C. § 3508(3)-(4) (1988).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
consummation.5 6 The Secretary of Agriculture can assess a civil
penalty where it is deemed appropriate for carrying out the pur-
poses of AFIDA.5 7 As this statute only applies to foreigners, it
clearly imposes obligations on them that are not forced upon U.S.
citizens.
Thus, upon his purchase of the farmland, Ernst must report
the purchase, the location of the property, and the amount paid. In
addition, he must post this information in the courthouse of the
county where the land is situated. This clearly imposes upon Ernst
an obligation that is obviously more burdensome than that im-
posed upon U.S. persons.
2. The Operation and Sale of the Property
Ernst, like any rational business person, is concerned with lim-
iting expenses in the business operation. One of the costs associ-
ated with a business is the state ad valorem tax. In Texas, when
property is used for agricultural purposes by U.S. citizens, a special
lower tax rate is allowed.5 8 The lower tax is not available to for-
eigners, however.59 Thus, from a cost/operational perspective,
Ernst will be treated unfavorably as compared to a U.S. citizen in
the amount of ad valorem taxes he must pay.
Eventually, Ernst will sell his property. In that event, the For-
eign Investments in Real Property Tax Act ("FIRPTA'),60 passed
in 1980, will tax the capital gain realized on the sale of the prop-
56. Any foreign person who acquires or transfers any interest other than a security
interest in agricultural land must submit a report to the Secretary of Agriculture not later
than 90 days after the date of such acquisition or transfer of the agricultural interest. 7
U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1988).
This report requires specific information on the person who purchases the land. In
addition, the information required is very detailed and of the type that most people would
prefer to maintain confidential; it includes the legal name and address of the foreign
owner, the legal description of the property, and the amount paid. Also, the information
must be posted in the courthouse of the county where the land is located. Id.
57. The amount cannot exceed 25% of the fair market value of the property at the
time of the assessment on the basis of .1% per week from the due date of the report. 7
U.S.C. § 3502 (1988).
58. The Texas ad valorem tax is generally based on the fair market value of the prop-
erty. A special capitalization rate, which greatly reduces the tax, is allowed for agricultural
property. TEX. TAx CODE ANN. §§ 23.01(a), 23.52-.53 (West 1992).
59. The Statute reaches this result by making the land ineligible for the special agri-
cultural appraisal if the land is owned by a non-resident alien individual or by a corpora-
tion when the majority of the shareholders are non-resident aliens. TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 23.56(2)-(3) (West 1992).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 897 (1988).
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erty.61 Congress enacted FIRPTA to correct a perceived violation
of the principle of horizontal equity.62 Prior to the passage of the
law, Ernst could have structured the sale in such a way that he
would not have to pay federal income tax on the capital gain real-
ized. This violated the principle of horizontal equity because a
U.S. person, on the same transaction, could not avoid the tax.
In addition to substantive provisions, FIRPTA contains a with-
holding mechanism on the sale of the property.63 In addition,
FIRPTA requires that Ernst report64 the purchase of the property.
Typically, federal income tax law does not require information on
purchases. On sales or results of operations, however, even a
purchase of residential real estate held exclusively for personal use
and not for profit is subject to reporting requirements under
FIRPTA.65 There is no comparable reporting or withholding legis-
lation for U.S. persons. The effect of this disparity is that non-resi-
dent aliens or foreign corporations are burdened more heavily than
U.S. nationals.
As in the BPT analysis, the question is whether the foreign
person should be taxed as a U.S. citizen. Is the foreign person truly
61. FIRPTA imposes a tax on the gain in the disposition of a U.S. real property inter-
est. A U.S. real property interest includes any interest in real property, except an interest
solely as a creditor held by an individual or through a U.S. Real Property Holding Corpo-
ration ("USRPHC"). 26 U.S.C. § 897(c) (1988). The Act also imposes a tax on gains in
the sale of stock of a USRPHC. A USRPHC is any domestic corporation where the fair
market value of its U.S. real property interest equals or exceeds 50% of the fair market
value of its U.S. real property interests, its interests in real property located outside the
United States, plus any other of its assets that are used or held for use in a trade or busi-
ness. 26 U.S.C. § 897(c)(2) (1988). Those corporations regularly traded in established se-
curities markets are specifically excluded from the laws regulating a USRPHC.
62. See generally Kaplan, supra note 45, at 1121 (reviewing the statute challenging the
idea of "like circumstances" existing between foreign and U.S. persons).
63. The purchaser in such case shall be required to deduct and withhold a tax equal to
10% of the amount realized on the disposition. 26 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1988).
64. Section 6039C(a) requires any foreign person holding a direct investment in a U.S.
real property interest for the calendar year to make a return setting forth: the name and
address of such person; a description of all U.S. real property interests held by such person
at any time during the calendar year; and such other information as the Secretary may by
regulation prescribe. For purposes of this Section, a foreign person shall be treated as
holding a direct investment in a U.S. real property interest during any calendar year if:
such person did not engage in a trade or business in the United States at any time during
the calendar year; and the fair market value of the U.S. real property interests held directly
by such person at any time during the year equals or exceeds $50,000. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6039C(a)-(b) (1988).
65. The purchaser or a transferee in such a case shall be required to deduct and with-
hold a tax equal to 10% of the amount realized on the disposition. 26 U.S.C. § 1445(2)
(1988).
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situated similarly to the U.S. citizen? Even assuming that horizon-
tal equity principles require substantive tax law changes and that
the withholding rules are justifiable, the reporting obligations seem
to go beyond placing the parties in like circumstances and to un-
duly burden the foreigners.
VI. THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION AND CONGRUENT
PRACTICE
A. The Case for Finding a Breach of International Law
The national treatment standard proscribes discriminatory
treatment of foreign persons as compared to domestic persons in
like circumstances. The United States includes the provision in
treaties to protect U.S. companies doing business abroad from dis-
crimination. The provision is essentially a part of the bargain nego-
tiated in the treaty. Although there are benefits, the statutes also
raise doubts about equal treatment. Ernst, for example, faces in-
vestment and tax statutes whose operative provisions are clearly
more burdensome on foreign persons.
The initial question is whether there has been a breach of in-
ternational law. In order to find a breach of international law,
there must be a finding of a "significant violation of a provision
essential to the agreement."' 6 Can the cumulative effect of the
statutes constitute a creeping breach of international law? Even in
the absence of such a finding, the United States must take steps to
modify its system or the procedures by which it enters into treaties
because there are other problems that can arise due to the failure
to live up to treaty provisions.
B. The Creation of an Environment of Disdain Toward Treaty
Provisions
The macroeconomic factors noted above create an environ-
ment of disdain towards treaty provisions. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 changed many substantive areas of both domestic and inter-
national tax law. It also specifically overrode many prior treaty
66. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 60(1)-(2). The President has the authority
to make the determination for finding a breach. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); RESATEMENT, supra note 1, § 335 cmt. b.
[Vol. 16:107124
Creeping Breach of International Law
provisions. 67 Although Congress partially retreated from this posi-
tion in subsequent legislation,68 the intent of Congress on treaty
provisions was clear: "If, in any of the cases above where Congress
does not believe that a conflict exists, there is in fact a conflict,
Congress intends that the 1986 Reform Act will apply notwith-
standing the Treaty." 69
The above statement by Congress leaves no doubt about what
it thinks of treaty obligations, regardless of the effect that a unilat-
eral overriding of treaty provisions could have on international
law. In addition, certain trade statutes7o allow the United States to
take unilateral retaliatory action against real or perceived unfair
trade practices. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") signatory countries have attacked this unilateral action
as violating the national treatment guarantee of that important
multilateral treaty. The disdain towards treaty provisions has
spread from the IRS to the U.S. Customs Service. 71
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States is reaching a point in its existence where it
no longer dominates international trade. Japan and the European
Community have emerged as world powers, and the Arab coun-
tries continue to expand as money centers. This shift in power has
changed the landscape of international trade. The present genera-
67. See generally John I. Forry & Michael J.A. Karlin, 1986 Act. Overrides, Conflicts,
and Interactions with U.S. Income Tax Treaties, TAx NOTES, May 25, 1987 (a special report
analyzing the cavalier attitude taken by Congress towards U.S. treaty obligations).
68. 1988 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 1012(aa), 102 Stat. 3342, 3493 (1988) [hereinafter Technical Act]. The Act set out certain
areas of the 1986 Act that would not apply if they were in conflict with treaty laws. See
RESEARCH INsTrrTrrE OF AMERICA, FEDERAL TAx COORDiNATOR (SEcoND), pt. 3, 0-
15002 (1991).
69. Technical Act, supra note 68, at 3535-36.
70. The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
71. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 was the implementing legis-
lation for the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System, a multilateral treaty intended to streamline tariff rates among contracting
states. See Omnibus Act, supra note 28, § 1201. The U.S. Customs Service's interpreta-
tions, however, in effect eschew the international character of its obligations. In its inter-
pretive note, the U.S. Customs Service states: "Uniformity in the interpretation of the
international system, the harmonized system (HS), is not a function of Customs. Customs
is charged with the administration and interpretation of the HS, the tariff enacted by Con-
gress." U.S. Customs Service, Guidance for Interpretation of Harmonized System, 54 Fed.
Reg. 35, 127 (1989). In effect, Customs is saying that their only responsibility is the inter-
pretation of the enabling legislation, not the treaty obligations that spawned it. See id.
19931
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tion is witnessing this change. Unfortunately, U.S. citizens are get-
ting caught up in the idea that this foreign progress is attributable
to some unfair treatment.
In light of the environment of distrust that exists among the
trading nations, the United States must resist reacting like a Third
World country. The idea that laws can be changed and that con-
tractual negotiations can unilaterally be modified simply because
the dynamics of trade are changing can do more harm than good.
Developed countries have long criticized developing countries for
formulating protectionist policies as a reaction to real or imaginary
threats posed by the developed countries. The United States, as a
capital and technology exporting country, must be careful about
passing legislation that adversely affects foreign nationals or for-
eign corporations. The threat of retaliation is very real, particu-
larly because the United States has more multinational
corporations than any other country. To find its place in the new
economic world order, the United States must resort to its
strengths-technological leadership, entrepreneurial spirit, and in-
genuity-not protectionist legislation.
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